After 26 years of fighting, in May 2009 the insurgency of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in Sri Lanka came to an end. Last year I took a class from terrorism expert Bruce Hoffman, who described the LTTE as one of the most professional terrorist groups in the world. They operated a (small) navy and air force in addition to capable ground forces. They had an extraordinarily well developed intelligence system, with infiltrators in every level of the Sri Lankan military, intelligence, and police forces. They were consummate fund raisers, receiving millions from foreign donors.
Their most unique attribute, however, was their innovation. They invented dozens of tactics over the decades, chief among them the suicide bombing. This tactic has since been copied by many other groups, to include Hamas, Hezbollah, Al Qaeda, etc.
As Dr. Hoffman described the capabilities of the LTTE, it occurred to me that the Sri Lankan military should just squash the LTTE. Sure, the LTTE are expert insurgents. But Sri Lanka is a tiny place. If the Sri Lankan military simply moved into the LTTE's safe areas, they would have nowhere to hide. The LTTE lacked one crucial aspect of a successful insurgency: sanctuary. They had nowhere to go when push came to shove.
And that's exactly what happened.
I have two questions about this:
1. Why did it take so long to get around to this?
2. What are the lessons for the U.S. and counterinsurgency?
I have already seen one op-ed claiming the LTTE defeat as a point for the "kill 'em all" school of counterinsurgency.
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