http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/ExumFickHumayun_TriageAfPak_June09.pdf
The part I was most interested in was the metrics of success. Metrics are difficult to define in a counterinsurgency, since many of the factors contributing to success or failure are intangible. In Vietnam, with signs of success elusive, enemy casualties ("body count") became the default metric. Easy to measure, easy to exaggerate, and visceral, this metric is now infamous for its uselessness.
Body count is now cropping up again in official reports, offered as a sign of success. It's understandable - it's a simple, concrete metric for those struggling to understand a complex war. The CNAS report cleverly flips this on its head, proposing Afghan civilian casualties (whether resulting from coalition or enemy action) as the chief metric of success. This is just as simple and concrete as enemy casualties.
The brilliance of this metric is that a full adoption would imply a significant operational change. Among other changes, troops chasing Taliban fighters through uninhabited mountain ranges would be moved to populated areas.
However, full adoption would also expose a massive capability gap. To keep Taliban from assassinating civilians, friendly troops must be present wherever civilians are. There just aren't enough troops to accomplish this.
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